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Remanding Multidistrict Litigation
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch*
INTRODUCTION
Scholars and commentators have long lamented vanishing
trials, empty courtrooms, and the rise of alternative dispute
resolution.1 Aggregation—whether through class actions or, as is
more likely today, multidistrict litigation—contributes steadily to
disappearing trials and fuels the new paradigm of making and
enforcing a settlement grid.2 Section 1407, the multidistrict
litigation statute, allows the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (“the Panel”) to transfer federal cases with a common
factual question to the same judge (“the transferee judge”) for
coordinated pretrial proceedings.3 In theory, after the parties
complete discovery on common issues and the transferee judge
rules on pretrial motions that affect the cases uniformly, the judge
should then remand those cases to their transferor courts for case-

Copyright 2014, by ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH.
* Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Many thanks
to the participants at the Louisiana Law Review’s Symposium—“The Rest of the
Story: Resolving the Cases Remanded by the MDL”—for their comments in
discussing these issues.
1. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: What the Numbers Tell
Us, What They May Mean, 10 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 3 (2004) (“Moreover, the drop
in trials has been recent and steep. In the early part of our period, there was an
increase in federal civil trials, peaking in 1985, when there were 12,529. From
then to now, the number of trials has dropped by more than 60 percent and the
portion of cases disposed of by trial has fallen from 4.7 percent to 1.8 percent.”);
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004)
(tracing the decline of trials in the United States); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where
Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical
Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004); Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, 88 A.B.A.
J. 24 (2002) (questioning whether the increase of settlements, mediation, and
arbitration will harm the justice system); Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment
and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1329 (2005) (examining the influence of summary judgment on the trend of
vanishing trials); Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The
Growth and Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 843 (2004) (analyzing the relationship between ADR and declining trials).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF
SETTLEMENT 57 (2007).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
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specific discovery and trial.4 Practice, however, has proven to be
quite different. Multidistrict litigation has frequently been
described as a “black hole”5 because transfer is typically a one-way
ticket.6 Indeed, interviews with attorneys who have been heavily
involved in these cases suggest that “the panel has abdicated its
proper role by providing no recourse to remedy or to exit an MDL
black hole.”7
The numbers lend truth to this proposition. As of 2010, the
Panel remanded only 3.425% of cases to their original districts.8
That number dwindled to 3.1% in 2012,9 and to a scant 2.9% in
4. Id. § 1407(a) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the
panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from
which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., In re U.S. Lines, Inc., No. 97-CIV-6727, 1998 WL 382023, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1998) (explaining appellants’ description of the asbestos
multidistrict litigation as “a black hole” and “the third level of Dante’s inferno”);
Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 2323, 2330 (2008) (“Indeed, the strongest criticism of the traditional MDL
process is that the centralized forum can resemble a ‘black hole,’ into which
cases are transferred never to be heard from again.”); John G. Heyburn II &
Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, 38
LITIGATION 27, 31 (2012) (“The single most prominent complaint about
multidistrict litigation arises from counsel’s negative experiences in so-called
black hole cases—those that seem not to move at an acceptable pace.”); Eduardo
C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict Litigation
(MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L. J. 97, 126 (2013)
(“Ultimately, neither the court nor the parties were ready, willing, or able to
move [asbestos] cases to trial and settlement. This stage of litigation led some
litigants to refer to MDL-875 as a ‘black hole,’ where cases disappeared forever
from the active dockets of the court.”).
6. See, e.g., In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d
1171, 1176 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“In practice, it has been reported, most cases
transferred under § 1407 are not remanded.”).
7. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 31.
8. Since Congress created the Panel in 1968, the Panel has centralized
349,914 civil actions for pretrial proceedings and, as of September 30, 2010,
transferee courts have terminated 266,264 actions, reassigned 398 actions to
transferor courts within the transferee district, and remanded 11,986 actions for
trial. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (2011),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010
/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/98N2-PH7R.
9. “Since its creation in 1968, the Panel has centralized 415,995 civil
actions for pretrial proceedings. By the end of 2012, a total of 13,065 actions
had been remanded for trial, 398 had been reassigned within the transferee
districts, 341,836 had been terminated in the transferee courts, and 60,696 were
pending throughout 54 transferee district courts.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics
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2013.10 To put this number in perspective, in 2012, the
multidistrict litigation docket comprised roughly 15% of all federal
civil cases.11
Retaining cases in hopes of forcing a global settlement can
cause a constellation of complications. These concerns range from
procedural justice issues over selecting a forum and correcting
error, to substantive concerns about fidelity to state laws, to
undermining democratic participation ideals fulfilled through jury
trials in affected communities. Yet, if transferee judges remanded
cases after overseeing discovery into common issues, they could
alleviate those concerns while avoiding inconsistent rulings on
common questions and streamlining discovery. But transferee
judges exacerbate these concerns when they disregard two inherent
limitations on their power.
First, Congress intended to limit multidistrict litigation’s
jurisdictional reach to pretrial proceedings.12 The statute’s
legislative history states that “trial in the originating district is
generally preferable from the standpoint of the parties and
witnesses.”13 Accordingly, the statute is designed to “maximize the
litigant’s traditional privileges of selecting where, when and how
to enforce his substantive rights or assert his defenses while
minimizing possible undue complexity from multi-party jury
trials.”14 This hints at the second limitation. When nationwide
plaintiffs’ claims are founded on state substantive laws, common
questions decrease as the differences between states’ laws increase.
This, in turn, creates a conundrum for transferee courts: applying
the originating state’s choice-of-law provision as Klaxon15 requires

/JudicialBusiness/2012/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation.aspx, archived at http:
//perma.cc/D65B-ZX5N.
10. “Since its creation in 1968, the Panel has centralized 462,501 civil
actions for pretrial proceedings. By the end of 2013, a total of 13,432 actions
had been remanded for trial, 398 actions had been reassigned within the
transferee districts, 359,432 actions had been terminated in the transferee courts,
and 89,123 actions were pending in 271 multidistrict litigation dockets
throughout 56 transferee district courts.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Judicial
Business/2013/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation.aspx, archived at http://per
ma.cc/MPX2-ETC8.
11. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 26.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
13. S. REP. NO. 90-454, at 5 (1967).
14. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 499 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
15. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (“The
conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must
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is inefficient and challenging, but overlooking those differences to
facilitate aggregate resolution ignores federalism concerns and
may raise Erie questions.16 Returning cases to their original
districts as Congress intended, however, easily solves this
conundrum.
Because remand occurs so infrequently, few courts or scholars
have addressed the topic. This Article thus aims to ignite that
discussion by explaining the potential advantages of remand,
arguing that remand’s scarcity is caused by repeat players’ uniform
interest in settlement and suggesting key junctures for both
transferee judges and the Panel to disaggregate cases.
Part I begins by exploring the procedural, substantive, and
communal benefits of remanding multidistrict litigation. Despite
the potential upside and persistent “black hole” concerns, statistics
show that remands rarely occur.17 Part II considers why: remands
disfavor those with litigation control—transferee judges, lead
plaintiffs’ attorneys, and defendants. Transferee judges deem
settlement a hallmark of their success. Lead plaintiffs’ lawyers try
to increase their fees by inserting fee provisions into settlements.
Likewise, plaintiffs’ attorneys can bypass doctrinal uncertainties
over weak claims by packaging plaintiffs together in a global
settlement. And aggregate settlements allow defendants to resolve
as many claims as possible in one stroke, take their hit, and return
to business, which their shareholders view as a net positive.
Moreover, the remand process itself defers to these vested
interests. Although the Panel could remand cases at a party’s
request, in practice it appears never to have done so. Rather, it
waits for the transferee judge to admit defeat and suggest
remand—thereby conceding failure.18
Despite these impediments, there is some evidence that a
normative shift may be underway. First, the Panel commissioned a
self-study in 2010 and, upon hearing criticisms about multidistrict
litigation’s perception as a “black hole,” Judge John G. Heyburn,

conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts. Otherwise the accident
of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of
justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side.”).
16. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Klaxon, 313 U.S.
at 496 (“We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, against such independent determinations by the federal courts extends
to the field of conflict of laws.”).
17. See supra notes 8–10; Robreno, supra note 5, at 143–44 (“In reality, as
it has turned out, for a variety of reasons, once the cases are consolidated they
rarely are remanded to the transferor court.”).
18. See infra Part II.A.3.
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the Panel’s chief judge, responded that the Panel is “encouraging
judges to consider remand where their basic work is completed.”19
Second, Judge Eduardo Robreno, who has presided over the
federal asbestos multidistrict litigation since 2008, and Judge Mark
Davidson, who presided over the Texas state court asbestos
litigation, have both begun disaggregating those cases for trial.20
Their testimony before the American Bar Association’s TIPS
Asbestos Task Force led the Reporter and long-time aggregation
proponent, Georgene Vairo, to question her pro-centralization
stance and deem “empty courtrooms” a problem.21 She concluded
that “we need to let go of the ‘make it go away’ and the ‘price of
doing business’ mentalities that drive all stakeholders—the
plaintiffs and defense bars, as well as the courts—and return to the
ideal of ‘letting lawyers be lawyers’ and getting cases ready for
trial.”22 Finally, the Symposium for which this Article was written,
“The Rest of the Story: Resolving the Cases Remanded by the
MDL,” is one of the first of its kind to examine remand and
explore its implications.
If a shift toward disaggregating is to occur, however, the “prosettlement” norm and “remand-as-a-failure” stigma must change.
Likewise, transferee judges need guidance on how and when to
remand. Accordingly, Part III examines the few cases in which
remand has occurred, proposes ideal times for remanding cases,
and encourages the Panel to reopen the direct line for parties to
request remand despite the transferee judge’s reluctance.
I. WHY REMAND?
The hurdle for centralizing cases through multidistrict litigation
is an extraordinarily low one: cases need to share but one common
question of fact.23 That factual question need not predominate or
determine the outcome; it simply must exist. Granted, the more
factual questions that cases share and the more central those
questions are to the litigation, the more likely the Panel is to
19. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 32.
20. See Robreno, supra note 5, at 127; Georgene Vairo, Lessons Learned by
the Reporter: Is Disaggregation the Answer to the Asbestos Mess?, 88 TUL. L.
R EV . 1039, 1057–59 (2014); Asbestos Task Force, Transcript of the
Proceedings, A.B.A. TORT TRIAL AND INS. PRAC. SEC. 18 (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/tips/asbestos_tf/10
13/13_10_1_asbestos_hearing_transcript.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http:
//perma.cc/4BQS-76KG.
21. Vairo, supra note 20, at 1070.
22. Id.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
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transfer and consolidate, but the threshold does not require
anything close to the “predominance of common questions”
required for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification. Accordingly,
conducting discovery as to common questions takes the parties
only so far; after that, each case will entail case-specific discovery
on issues like specific causation and elements particular to each
state’s law.
Consolidating can thus further some of aggregation’s goals,
like “promoting the efficient use of litigation resources.”24 But
given the low threshold for commonality, multidistrict litigation
can also reach a point of diminishing returns and inhibit the
enforcement and development of substantive law because
transferee courts cannot retain cases for trial.25 Consequently,
remanding these cases once the transferee judge resolves common
pretrial issues can yield a number of intertwined procedural,
substantive, and democratic benefits.26
Procedurally, disaggregating can help correct error by
bypassing private, global settlements that are inherently nonappealable, building secondary judicial review into the process and
incorporating pluralistic fact-finding by jurors on plaintiff-specific
and state-specific issues. Substantively, if “local”27 judges apply
familiar state laws and explain the vagaries of those laws to jurors
from the relevant community, it should produce greater accuracy,
less error, and increased fidelity to state laws. Moreover,
considering statewide classes and conducting trials in affected
communities can ease the regulatory mismatch between
defendants’ behavior, which affects citizens nationwide; transferee
courts, which have nationwide authority over pretrial matters only;
and a state’s laws, which govern defendants’ conduct toward its
citizens. The following paragraphs explain these advantages in
more detail.
First, remanding cases would increase error-correction
opportunities. When transferee judges refuse to remand to goad
parties into settling, they leave parties with few avenues for
appellate review. Erroneous decisions can persist, and the judge
24. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §
1.03 (2010).
25. The Supreme Court’s Lexecon decision held that transferee judges could
not transfer cases to themselves for trial. See generally Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). Of course, the transferee
judge could try cases filed in his or her own district or with the parties’ consent.
26. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667,
681–87 (2013) [hereinafter Burch, Disaggregating].
27. By “local,” I mean federal transferor judges sitting within the state
whose laws will control the dispute’s outcome.
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will have eviscerated plaintiffs’ attorneys’ most powerful
bargaining chip: the threat of trial.28 Unlike class action
settlements, private aggregate settlements are not appealable. And,
as I have explored elsewhere,29 aggregate settlements may include
coercive terms designed to further controlling stakeholders’
interests at the expense of non-lead attorneys and plaintiffs.
Because most interim rulings leading up to settlement are not
dispositive, they are reviewable only through an extraordinary writ
of mandamus or subsequent dismissal.30 Even if an appellate court
grants mandamus or reviews a dismissed case, it tends to do so
using the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.31
By contrast, remanding cases to their transferor districts—and
even consolidating those cases on a statewide basis32—would build
judicial redundancy into the process.33 Although transferor judges
receiving remanded cases should not routinely revisit pretrial
28. Plaintiffs often use the threat of trial “to press for a better offer,” so
when this is taken away as a realistic opportunity, individual counsel may be
“disarmed.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997). See
also NAGAREDA, supra note 2, at 19–20 (“[M]ass tort plaintiffs’ lawyers have
only one real bargaining chip, but it is a big one: their power to take cases to
trial. Trial dates are scarce resources. Their availability is limited by the capacity
of the judicial system.”).
29. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 512–14 (2011); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
[hereinafter Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation].
30. Transferee judges tend to issue “Lone Pine” orders after most plaintiffs’
cases are resolved through a comprehensive settlement. These orders require
non-settling claimants to submit specific proof regarding their injuries to avoid
dismissal. See Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986); see, e.g., Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200
F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2000).
31. See In re Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 540, 542–43 (5th Cir. 1992).
Dismissals under Rule 16(f) are reviewed using the abuse of discretion standard.
See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642
(1976) (“The question, of course, is not whether this Court, or whether the Court
of Appeals, would as an original matter have dismissed the action; it is whether
the District Court abused its discretion in so doing.”); see, e.g., In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 F. App’x 391 (5th Cir. 2010) (using the abuse-ofdiscretion standard in reviewing the allegation that Judge Fallon should have
recused himself based on his dual roles as judge and Chief Administrator of the
Master Settlement Agreement).
32. For a proposal along these lines, see Burch, Disaggregating, supra note
26, at 687–93.
33. On the benefits of judicial redundancy, see Robert M. Cover, The Uses
of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 639, 646–57 (1981), and Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the
Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369 (2008).
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rulings,34 they will inevitably have to expand, modify, or vacate
certain orders affecting trial. As the Multidistrict Litigation Manual
suggests, transferor courts can alter and vacate “earlier rulings so
long as there is a good reason to do so.”35 Although the law-of-thecase doctrine underscores these parameters,36 remanding cases
allows transferor courts to evaluate state-specific questions and
correct transferee judges’ misinterpretations,37 as well as decide
questions that transferee judges declined to determine.38 Because
34. See Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 577 (1978).
35. DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 10.17 (Westlaw
2014). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.133 (4th ed. 2004)
(“Although the transferor judge has the power to vacate or modify rulings made
by the transferee judge, subject to comity and ‘law of the case’ considerations,
doing so in the absence of a significant change of circumstances would frustrate
the purposes of centralized pretrial proceedings.” (citing Weigel, supra note
34)); In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Under the law
of the case doctrine and general principles of comity, a successor judge has the
same discretion to reconsider an order as would the first judge, but should not
overrule the earlier judge’s order or judgment merely because the later judge
might have decided matters differently.” (quoting United States v. O’Keefe, 128
F.3d 885, 891 (5th Cir. 1997))).
36. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432
(3d Cir. 2009) (vacating and remanding the transferee judge’s decision to vacate
the transferor judge’s decision to compel arbitration because it violated the law
of the case); In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d at 411 (“[T]ransferor courts should
use the law of the case doctrine to determine whether to revisit a transferee
court’s decision.”); In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 653 F.2d 671, 678
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying the law of the case to multidistrict litigation).
37. This gives transferor courts a sound reason for revisiting the question.
See In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d at 411–12 (“The law of the case doctrine
requires that courts not revisit the determinations of an earlier court unless ‘(i)
the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, (ii) controlling
authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues,
or (iii) the decision was clearly erroneous and would work . . . manifest
injustice.’” (quoting Propes v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 2009))).
In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., the Supreme Court has
explained the discretionary scope of the law of the case:
A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a
coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should
be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as
where the initial decision was “clearly erroneous and would work a
manifest injustice.”
486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8
(1983)). See Gottschall v. Crane Co., 2014 WL 5025725, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 8, 2014) (holding that the transferee judge’s interpretation of California law
was incorrect in regusing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel “to bind a
California litigant to a principle of law adopted in the prior foreign court
litigation”).
38. See, e.g., In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic Prods. Liab.
Litig., 276 F.R.D. 336, 347 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (declining to certify a class due to
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some transferee judges refuse to rule on summary judgment
motions that implicate state laws,39 remand likewise offers parties
an opportunity to air substantive disputes, proceed to trial, and
appeal—if warranted.
Second, remanding cases can ease the substantive burdens
caused by aggregating state-law claims with minimal commonality.
When transferee judges consider state-law claims (such as product
liability, consumer protection, fraud, warranty, and unjust
enrichment) from around the country, they are confronted with
sticky choice-of-law questions, particularly when plaintiffs request
class certification. To make these classes seem manageable and
ostensibly avoid choice-of-law problems, plaintiffs may contend
that a single state’s law should apply,40 try to shoehorn state-law
claims into a federal cause of action like RICO,41 or suggest that
the differences in state laws can be grouped into a few
subclasses.42 Plaintiffs may likewise forgo personal injury claims
that implicate individual questions, which can jeopardize class
members’ ability to pursue those claims later.43 But, as some courts
recognize, when issues are state-specific and do not affect all of the
cases, transferor judges are best equipped to decide them.44
the “vagaries of multiple jurisdictions” but suggesting that transferor judges
could revisit the issue of whether “a statewide class is appropriate”).
39. See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
1014, 1997 WL 109595, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 1997) (declining to rule on
summary judgment motions because the transferee court “would be putting itself
in the shoes of the transferor courts”).
40. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288
F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
41. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004).
42. See, e.g., Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2007); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 285 S.W.3d 634 (Ark. 2008). Sometimes transferee
judges will have plaintiffs file a master complaint in the transferee forum and
then use that complaint to apply the laws of the transferee court’s forum state.
E.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d
1069, 1078 (S.D. Ind. 2001). Most judges disagree with this approach. See, e.g.,
In re Conagra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 692–93 (N.D.
Ga. 2008); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig.,
489 F. Supp. 2d 932, 934–36 (D. Minn. 2007); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.,
239 F.R.D. 450, 454–55 (E.D. La. 2006).
43. E.g., Colindres v. QuietFlex Mfg., 235 F.R.D. 347 (S.D. Tex. 2006);
Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 243 (W.D. Tex.
1999).
44. In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic Prods. Liab. Litig., 276
F.R.D. 336, 339 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (“Plaintiffs essentially ask the undersigned to
decide, for instance, that a class of Washington consumers should be certified
for trial in the Western District of Washington. This issue affects only a few
cases, and relates to the manner in which the case will be tried. It is not an issue

408

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

Remanding cases to these judges would allow those most familiar
with state law to determine whether to certify statewide classes.45
In this way, remand could alleviate some of the tension
between multidistrict litigation and basic federalism principles.46
As Larry Kramer has observed, when states differ about what
parties’ rights should be, those differences “are not a ‘cost’ of the
system; . . . They are its object, something to be embraced and
affirmatively valued.”47 But multidistrict litigation can muddy
states’ laws through settlement. All-encompassing settlements may
water down state-law variations to make it easier to administer
claims, which can allow plaintiffs with weak or invalid claims
under their states’ law to receive compensation at others’ expense.
Conducting bellwether trials before settlement helps to
establish claim values, but transferee courts are limited to trying
cases either originally filed in that district or by the parties’
consent.48 Thus, bellwether trials before citizens of a single
transferee forum (that often apply that forum’s substantive laws)
may do little to maintain substantive distinctions between state
laws or test those variations before the citizens that helped enact
them.
Jury trials are, after all, meant to bring a community’s diverse
perspectives and norms to bear on fact finding. Communities—
even within a single state—can vary dramatically. Given the
plurality of viewpoints and experiences within our country, it is no
surprise that jurors may approach the adjudicative and deliberative
process dissimilarly even with regard to the same product or

that the undersigned should dictate to the transferor courts, but is an issue that is
more appropriately decided by the judges charged with presiding over the
trial.”); In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74,
77 (D. Me. 2011) (“[T]he transferor courts, each of which is familiar with the
state law of their respective jurisdictions, are in a better position to assess the
parties’ state law arguments and their impact on the class certification issue.”).
45. In re Bisphenol-A (BPA), 276 F.R.D. at 347 (“Once the cases are
returned to the transferor courts, relatively little effort will be needed for
Plaintiffs to pursue individual suits. There is also the prospect that one or more
transferor courts will conclude—without the vagaries of multiple jurisdictions to
worry about and a greater familiarity with that state’s law—that a statewide
class is appropriate.”).
46. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d
1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002).
47. Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
547, 579 (1996).
48. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26,
40 (1998).
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action.49 As many debates illustrate—think immigration or gun
control, for example—plural communities fall along a broad
spectrum when it comes to moral views and social values. So,
although bellwether trials in the transferee forum provide the
public and the nonparticipating plaintiffs a glimpse into the
contested issues, without remand, multidistrict litigation can
undermine democratic values of communal participation and fact
finding by citizens nationwide.50
At its core, this bespeaks a problem of regulatory mismatch
between transferee courts’ limited decisional authority and the
scope of behavior they attempt to regulate. As Professors
Issacharoff and Nagareda explained, “a regulatory mismatch may
occur whenever the authority charged with overseeing some
economic activity has jurisdiction that is smaller than the conduct
to be regulated.”51 For example, a variant of this concern led
Congress to enact the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and
thereby prevent a single state court from regulating an industry’s
nationwide conduct under its own state law.52
But CAFA contributed to the mismatch in multidistrict
litigation when states’ laws provide the decisional authority.
Transferee judges now have federal, pretrial jurisdiction over many
would-be state class actions, but they cannot try those cases. And,
because there is no federal law governing product liability, for
example, they cannot resolve those cases with anything other than
state law. As transferee judges often admit, they are not the
foremost authority on how to apply other states’ laws.53 So, absent
remanding cases to their transferor courts,54 the nationwide scope
49. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes
Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 864–81 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Rights
and Their Critics, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 745 (1995) (“[The right to a
jury trial] ensures a role for the community in adjudicative proceedings.”).
50. Burch, Disaggregating, supra note 26, at 685–87.
51. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under
Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1674 (2008).
52. Id. at 1674–75.
53. In re Activated Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing Mktg. & Sales
Practices Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 (D. Minn. 2012) (“‘[T]he transferor
courts, each of which is familiar with the state law of their respective
jurisdictions, are in a better position to assess’ these claims.” (quoting In re
Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Me.
2011))). See Light Cigarettes Case, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (“[T]he transferor
courts . . . are in a better position to assess the parties’ state law arguments and
their impact on the class certification issue.”).
54. Transferee judges have requested that the Panel remand cases so that
transferor judges can consider whether to certify statewide classes. See, e.g., In
re Light Cigarettes Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1331
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of a transferee judge’s authority to handle pretrial matters is illsuited to resolve state causes of action through trial or wholesale
class certification.55 Settlement is the only option. But settlement
substitutes difficult choice-of-law questions for consent and buries
differences in the claims administration process.
II. IMPEDIMENTS TO REMAND
As is the trend in all civil cases, most multidistrict litigation
settles.56 This is perhaps the principal reason behind the low
remand rate, at least once the judge decides dispositive motions.
As the trend in civil settlements suggests, by one token,
multidistrict litigation settlements are nothing extraordinary. But
the pressures prompting these settlements are far from
conventional. Indeed, the incentive structure for controlling
stakeholders (lead plaintiffs’ attorneys, defendants, and transferee
judges) and the procedural requirements for remand are stacked so
heavily in favor of settlement that remanding even 2.9% of cases is
remarkable.
A. Remand Contravenes Repeat Players’ Vested Interests
There comes a point in nearly every multidistrict litigation
where controlling stakeholders’ interests converge upon
settlement. These stakeholders include plaintiffs’ lead lawyers
(lead counsel, steering committees, liaison counsel, etc.),
defendants and their attorneys, and transferee judges—people who
are often repeat players.57 Appointing lead lawyers wrests
decision-making authority away from plaintiffs’ individually
chosen counsel and places it in the hands of lawyers who are often
known as settlement artists—not trial attorneys. These lead
lawyers control everything from discovery to settlement

(J.P.M.L. 2012) [hereinafter Light Cigarettes Case JPML Remand Order]
(remanding cases involving putative statewide classes involving “only claims
brought under the law of each plaintiff’s respective state”); In re Chrysler LLC
2.7 Liter V-6 Engine Oil Sludge Prods. Liab. Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373
(J.P.M.L. 2009) (suggesting that the transferee judge might remand cases for
class certification consideration).
55. Issue classes targeted at the defendant’s conduct might, however, be
another possibility.
56. Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150–51
(2006).
57. Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 29 (manuscript at
22–25).
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negotiations. Because plaintiffs have no option to “opt out” of
multidistrict litigation and only regain control of their lawsuit in
the unlikely event of remand, they are hostages to the controlling
stakeholders’ interests.58 And, as this Section describes, settlement—
not remand—furthers the existing power structure’s interests, which
explains why transferee judges have used remand as a threat to
bring stakeholders to the negotiating table.59
1. Lead Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Interests
Lead lawyers have two income sources in multidistrict
litigation: contingent fees from their own clients and court-ordered
“taxes” from plaintiffs who benefit from their efforts. As to the
former, the tendency to settle in all contingent-fee cases has been
well documented,60 and lead lawyers are arguably no more
incentivized to settle than non-lead lawyers on those grounds. But
common benefit fees—the taxes from non-clients’ cases—are a
different matter altogether. The emerging common law surrounding
these fees is an unpredictable hodgepodge of legal doctrines and
piecemeal rationales.61 Global settlements have thus begun to offer
lead lawyers an ethically questionable route around this uncertainty.
Because the judge gives them power to negotiate on plaintiffs’
behalf, lead lawyers have started brokering deals that incorporate
their fee awards into settlement provisions.62

58. See BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & CATHERINE R. BORDEN, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., MANAGING MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES 48
(2011) (“Remember that in any products liability MDL, it is often the individual
plaintiff who may be inconvenienced the most by the inclusion of his or her
action in the centralized proceedings.”).
59. See Jeremy T. Grabill, The Pesky Persistence of Class Action Tolling in
Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 433, 440 (2014) (“In the MDL
context, given the threat of remand that the MDL statute confers upon transferee
courts, it is inevitable that a time will come when the parties begin thinking about
a potential global settlement.”); Kurt Orzeck, Judge Delays Wind-Down in MDL
over Merck’s Fosamax, LAW 360 (Oct. 4, 2013, 3:59 PM), https://www.law
360.com/articles/478316/judge-delays-wind-down-in-mdl-over-merck-s-fosamax,
archived at http://perma.cc/Q9ZG-9BSP; Julie A. Steinberg, Merck Agrees to $28
Million Settlement to Resolve Fosamax Jawbone Decay Suits, Class Action Litig.
Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 1482 (Dec. 13, 2013).
60. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in
Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1293 (2012).
61. Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 29 (manuscript at
33–34).
62. Id. (manuscript at 57–60). I have argued elsewhere that compensating
lead lawyers on a quantum-meruit basis would help alleviate these doctrinal
problems. Id.
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For example, in Guidant, Vioxx, and the Genetically Modified
Rice Litigation, lead lawyers inserted terms into global settlements
that increased their fees and required settling plaintiffs to waive
their fee objections if they wanted to enroll in the settlement.63
Lead lawyers combine these terms with other provisions that give
defendants the right to withdraw the offer if too few plaintiffs sign
up, and require plaintiffs’ attorneys to recommend their clients take
the deal or withdraw from representing them.64 Terms like these
raise the prospect that consent is less than voluntary—even in an
era that has embraced contracts of adhesion and mandatory
arbitration.65 But, regardless of one’s views on consent, turning a
blind eye to the plain risk of structural collusion presented when
lead lawyers negotiate their fees with defendants is an entirely
different matter.66
When lead lawyers want to avoid the doctrinal uncertainty
surrounding their fees via settlement, they hand defendants a
meaningful bargaining chip. Defendants care little about how a
lump sum is divvied up among plaintiffs and their attorneys,67 but
they can demand significant concessions in return. As Professors
Silver and Miller pointed out, “[t]he defendant is happy to offer
[lead attorneys] ‘red-carpet treatment on fees’—higher common
benefit fees cost the defendant nothing—in return for other things,

63. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
05–1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008), amended in part,
MDL 05-1708, 2008 WL 3896006 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008); In re Vioxx Prods.
Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. La. 2008), on reconsideration in part,
650 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. La. 2009); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig.,
No. 4:06-MD-1811 CDP, 2010 WL 716190, at *9–11 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2010)
(creating a common benefit fund). See MDL Settlement Agreement, Genetically
Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06-MD-1811 CDP, 2010 WL 716190 [hereinafter
MDL Settlement Agreement].
64. See, e.g., Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL-1657, No. 05-01657 para.
1.2.8.1 (E.D. La.) (initial settlement agreement), available at http://www
.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Settlement_Agreement.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/R7 VS-B34K. After some plaintiffs’ attorneys contended the
settlement conflicted with ethical rules, it was reinterpreted to mean that the
attorneys should recommend the deal only if it was in the client’s best interest.
Alex Berenson, Lawyers Seek to Alter Settlement Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
21, 2007, at C4.
65. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
66. Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 29.
67. See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements,
58 KAN. L. REV. 979, 1010 (2010) (describing the problems caused by lump-sum
settlements).
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such as a smaller settlement fund, a later funding date, or a higher
participation threshold.”68
Absent a global settlement, lead lawyers stumble into less
charted territory. Although transferee judges often establish
common funds from which to pay lead lawyers, the percentage and
calculation methods can vary dramatically.69 Judges tend to
analogize to the class action’s common fund doctrine and borrow from
contract principles, ethics, and equity.70 And because compensation
arguably rests on an unjust enrichment theory—that non-lead attorneys
have received something of value for which they have not paid—
negotiating a global settlement surely makes that argument more
palatable for both lead lawyers and judges.
Global settlements may likewise encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to
file weak claims. Known as the “Field-of-Dreams” problem—“If you
build it, they will come”—multidistrict litigation coaxes claimants out
of the woodwork regardless of their claim’s strength in hopes of
initially staying buried under mounting cases then cashing in on
settlement.71 Global settlements encourage this phenomenon when the
claims administration process grinds together high and low value
claims and under- or overcompensates them respectively. The
incentives fueling this problem vary from attorney to attorney: some
might file questionable cases to increase fees, particularly after their
fees are reapportioned to lead lawyers, while others might file a legion
of undifferentiated claims in hopes of garnering a leadership role.72
Whatever the rationale, so long as remand—and testing cases through
trial—remains an unrealistic probability, aggregating cases will
perpetuate a find, bind, and grind mentality.
If remand became the norm rather than the exception, it could
alleviate the Field-of-Dreams problem. Attorneys hoping to free ride
on lead lawyers’ efforts by filing undifferentiated claims may dismiss
weak claims if faced with trial. And if remand became routine, it
might deter attorneys from filing questionable claims in the first place.
Then, if settlement occurred pre-remand, claimants with strong claims

68. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 107, 134 (2010).
69. Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 29 (manuscript at
28–30).
70. Id. (manuscript at 28).
71. Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not to MDL? A Defense Perspective, 24
LITIGATION 43, 45 (1998).
72. Having a large inventory of cases may make the attorney seem like a
power broker such that the judge appoints her to a leadership position. Burch,
Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 29 (manuscript at 5).
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would stand a better chance of receiving compensation commensurate
with their claims’ strength.
2. Defendants’ Interests
Defendants often stand to gain the most through centralization
and global settlement.73 Multidistrict litigation dislodges plaintiffs
from their chosen fora, forces plaintiffs lawyers (who have
reputations for not hunting well in packs) to battle for lead
positions, and renders trials a very distant threat. Centralization
likewise advantages defendants by making meaningful closure
possible through a global settlement.
Granted, it goes without saying that defendants would prefer to
have all the cases against them dismissed. But once they lose
dispositive motions and can assess the universe of claims before
them, they tend to think about ways to achieve the maximum
amount of finality for the lowest possible price. Class actions once
served this interest moderately well, but even “settlement
classes”74 have become increasingly difficult to certify in litigation
where individual issues outnumber common ones, like in product
liability or other mass tort cases.75 Thus, in some cases like Vioxx,
defendants used innovative measures and coercive settlement
tactics to achieve at least an 85% closure rate.76
This need for finality, which investors demand, explains
defendants’ near-uniform opposition to remanding cases for trial.77
73. See, e.g., Herrmann, supra note 71, at 44 (noting that multidistrict
litigation proceedings give defendants time to “organize a defense, negotiate a
global settlement, or file a bankruptcy proceeding”). Likewise, multidistrict
litigation proceedings can precipitate the filing of weak claims and make
discovery limits difficult. Id. at 45–46.
74. See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 981–87 (2014) (explaining why even negotiated
settlements in cases not yet certified as classes can be problematic).
75. Burch, Disaggregating, supra note 26, at 673–76.
76. See supra note 61.
77. See, e.g., In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F.
Supp. 2d 74, 76 (D. Me. 2011) (noting that the defendants opposed the
plaintiffs’ motion for remand because “class certification is a pretrial issue that
the Court should resolve in order to achieve the substantial efficiencies
contemplated by the JPML’s reference”); Light Cigarettes Case JPML Remand
Order, supra note 54 (denying the defendant’s request that the Panel vacate its
order remanding the cases to their respective transferor courts); In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1663, 2009 WL 1874085 (D.N.J. June 30,
2009) [hereinafter Brokerage Case June Opinion] (noting the defendants’
opposition to remand request); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., MDL No.
1663, 2009 WL 580238, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2009) (“Defendants vigorously
oppose the instant [remand] motion, and assert that U-Haul should remain a
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Remanding cases, whether for individual treatment or state-specific
class actions, makes it much harder to corral and extinguish claims
through a global settlement. Rather than dealing with a centralized
authority like the plaintiffs’ steering committee, defendants are
forced to negotiate with disparate attorneys and lobby against
piecemeal, statewide class actions that offer all of the downsides and
none of the finality-related upsides of global settlements.78
3. Transferee Judges’ Interest
Finally, transferee judges have an interest in pushing parties to
settle. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 expressly authorizes
judges to facilitate settlement discussions.79 As pretrial judges,
transferee judges would be remiss not to encourage these
conversations. Yet, as Judge Jack Weinstein has observed,
“Federal judges tend to be biased toward settlement. . . . We clean
the dishes and cutlery so they can be reused for the long line of
incoming customers. Settlements are the courts’ automatic washerdryers.”80 Thus, this pro-settlement stance has become standard

party to MDL 1663 for a variety of reasons.”); In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. Qui Tam Litig. (No. II), 560 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1350 (J.P.M.L. 2008)
(rejecting the defendants’ arguments that remand is premature); In re Managed
Care Litig., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1347 (J.P.M.L. 2006) (remanding a case over
the defendants’ objections); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d
1196, 1197 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (noting the defendant’s opposition to remand
because “this case will move more expeditiously if it remains part of the
MDL”).
78. Light Cigarettes Case JPML Remand Order, supra note 54
(“Defendants also contend that ordering remand now would permit plaintiffs to
‘game the system.’ They argue, in other words, that if plaintiffs in future MDLs
prevail on exemplar class certification rulings made by the respective transferee
courts, they will seek to have those rulings applied to all pending and future
related class actions, but, where certification is denied, plaintiffs in the nonexemplar cases will simply move for a suggestion of remand and thus seek a
second bite of the apple before the transferor courts.”).
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5).
80. Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement
(1984), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1265 (2009). See also In re Nineteen
Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d
603, 605 (1st Cir. 1992) (observing that the JPML consolidated cases in front of
Judge Raymond Acosta, but “[s]hortly thereafter, the Chief Justice appointed the
Honorable Louis C. Bechtle as a ‘settlement judge,’” such that while Judge
Acosta advanced the litigation toward trial, “Judge Bechtle endeavored to
advance settlement prospects by determining individual and aggregate values for
the cases”); Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation?
Toward a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer
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operating procedure for transferee judges. Judge Eldon Fallon
conceded as much:
The MDL transferee court theoretically oversees the
discovery aspect of the case and remands various cases
back to the transferor courts for further proceedings. In
practice, however, it is not unusual for the transferee court
to conduct bellwether trials and encourage a global
resolution of the matter before recommending to the Panel
that the case be remanded.81
According to this view, settlement is the solution and remand is a
last resort.
Given this perspective, it is not surprising that both the Panel
and transferee judges lamented the Supreme Court’s Lexecon
decision. Lexecon forbade transferee judges from transferring cases
to themselves for trial, and thus impeded settlement.82 As former
Panel chairman Judge William Terrell Hodges observed, “It would
obviously be a lot more efficient if the transferee judge had the
authority to try the cases that remain. That would add another
settlement tool into the calculus that normally produces settlement
anyway.”83
So, even though coaxing settlement strays furthest from a
judge’s adjudicative role,84 it is not a secret that transferee judges
(like most federal judges) are pro-settlement.85 But, as Judge
William Young explained, “the ‘settlement culture’ for which the
federal courts are so frequently criticized is nowhere more
prevalent than in MDL practice.”86 As he notes:

Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2288–89 (2008) (discussing settlement bias in
multidistrict litigation).
81. Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74
LA. L. REV. 371, 373–74 (2014).
82. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26,
35 (1998).
83. Gregory Hansel, Extreme Litigation: An Interview with Judge Wm.
Terrell Hodges, Chairman of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 19
ME. B.J. 16, 21 (2004).
84. Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113
YALE L.J. 27, 43 (2003).
85. See Marcus, supra note 80, at 2272; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (urging Congress to expand the
Class Action Fairness Act to promote final, global resolution of mass disputes).
86. Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D.
Mass. 2006).
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The Manual for Complex Litigation seems virtually to
command this result: One of the values of multidistrict
proceedings is that they bring before a single judge all of
the federal cases, parties, and counsel comprising the
litigation. They therefore afford a unique opportunity for
the negotiation of a global settlement. Few cases are
remanded for trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in
the transferee court. As a transferee judge, it is advisable to
make the most of this opportunity and facilitate the
settlement of the federal and any related state cases.87
This directive only partially explains the added settlement push
in multidistrict litigation. Transferee judges also receive less
obvious, self-interested benefits from settling high-profile cases.
For example, the Panel views quickly settling a complex case as a
hallmark of success that favorably disposes it to reward that judge
with a new assignment.88 Multidistrict litigations are plum judicial
assignments; they involve interesting facts, media attention, and
some of the nation’s most talented attorneys. Given that only
around 27% of active judges and 20% of senior judges receive
these assignments, federal judges often “campaign” for them.89
Conversely, failing to resolve cases quickly can subject
transferee judges to scrutiny from the Panel.90 As Judge Eduardo
Robreno, who handled the asbestos multidistrict litigation, observed,
“As a matter of judicial culture, remanding cases is viewed as an
acknowledgement that the MDL judge has failed to resolve the case,
87. Id. at 150–51 (emphasis in original) (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 20.132 (4th ed. 2004)).
88. This observation is based principally on conversations I have had with
federal judges and their clerks, the general perception that judges who receive
these cases are especially capable, and the prestige and publicity that generally
accompanies such an assignment. See generally Susan Willett Bird, The
Assignment of Cases to Federal District Court Judges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 475,
482 n.42 (1975) (reporting that related cases were “assigned specifically to
Judge X . . . because he was ‘especially able’”); DAVID F. HERR & NICOLE
NAROTZKY, AM. LAW INST., THE JUDICIAL PANEL’S ROLE IN MANAGING MASS
LITIGATION 249, 299 (2008) (“The Panel undoubtedly considers the ability and
reputation of a judge in determining whether to assign complex, multidistrict
litigation to him or her. . . . In one case, [the Panel] expressly identified former
Panel membership, as well as leadership roles in various federal court
committees as a reason for selecting Chief Judge Sam Pointer as a transferee
judge.”).
89. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 30.
90. Id. at 31–32 (quoting Judge John G. Heyburn II, the chair of the Panel,
as saying, “[T]he panel did undertake a study of approximately 40 of our oldest
dockets to look for any common problems. From this study, we have identified
certain areas of concern and communicated these to our transferee judges as a
group”).
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by adjudication or settlement, during the MDL process.”91 So,
transferee judges have their own professional and reputational
incentives to broker deals and thwart remand.
B. Remand Procedures Defer to Vested Interests
Current procedures for requesting and effectuating remand to
transferor courts serve chiefly to reinforce controlling stakeholders’
interests. Even if they wanted to, transferee judges have no power to
remand cases directly to transferor courts.92 They must instead
suggest that the Panel remand the cases.93 And although parties may
make remand requests directly to the Panel,94 the Panel appears
never to have granted a request without first receiving the transferee
judge’s blessing.95 Despite judges lobbying for multidistrict

91. Robreno, supra note 5, at 144.
92. In re Wilson, 451 F.3d 161, 165 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006).
93. In re Roberts, 178 F.3d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1999); In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
94. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
Rule 10.1(b), 277 F.R.D. 480 (2011). Rule 10.1(b) states:
Initiation of Remand. Typically, the transferee judge recommends
remand of an action, or a part of it, to the transferor court at any time
by filing a suggestion of remand with the Panel. However, the Panel
may remand an action or any separable claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim or third-party claim within it, upon
(i) the transferee court’s suggestion of remand,
(ii) the Panel's own initiative by entry of an order to show cause, a
conditional remand order or other appropriate order, or
(iii) motion of any party.
95. See generally id. at Rule 10.3 (requiring additional showings if the
transferee court does not initiate remand “[b]ecause the Panel is reluctant to
order a remand absent the suggestion of the transferee judge”); In re Patenaude,
210 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Deference is not abdication, however, and
the presence or absence of a remand recommendation from the transferee judge
as a factor in the Panel’s decision-making process seems to us entirely
reasonable.”); In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 435 F. Supp. 930, 932
(J.P.M.L. 1977) (“In the absence of a suggestion from the transferee judge for
remand of these actions, however, we find the question of remand premature.”);
In re Holiday Magic Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L.
1977) (“In considering the question of remand, the Panel has consistently given
great weight to the transferee judge’s determination that remand of a particular
action at a particular time is appropriate because the transferee judge, after all,
supervises the day-to-day pretrial proceedings.” (citing In re IBM Peripheral
EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 407 F. Supp. 254, 256 (J.P.M.L. 1976))); Weigel,
supra note 34, at 583–84 (“In the exercise of that [remand] power, the Panel
defers to the views of the transferee judge. Absent a recommendation of remand
from the transferee judge, any party advocating remand bears an especially
heavy burden.”). In In re Baseball Bat Antitrust Litigation, the Panel did remand
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assignments, as a matter of practice, the Panel refuses to “look over
the shoulders of [its] transferee judges” for fear of “severely
compromis[ing] [its] ability to attract [them].”96
Appellate judges further reinforce this single-gatekeeper system
in two ways. First, they review the Panel’s decisions only upon a
writ of mandamus and subject those decisions to the clear error
standard.97 So, if the Panel ignores cases that disappear into an
abyss of multidistrict litigation, the appellate courts offer no
alternative recourse. Second, the appellate courts have liberally
interpreted the standard that transferee judges can hold on to cases
for pretrial purposes by observing that “coordination can be found
even if common issues are present only in relation to cases that
have already terminated”98 and “overlapping issues do not
necessarily need to touch the petitioners’ particular cases.”99
Under this rationale, even once the parties complete common
discovery and have only case-specific discovery remaining, the
transferee judge can hold a case hostage as long as she wants. This
creates a powerful settlement tool, but undermines the Supreme
Court’s Lexecon decision.100 In Lexecon, the Court explained that
section 1407 uses mandatory nomenclature dictating that the Panel
“shall” remand actions once pretrial proceedings conclude unless
those cases were terminated.101 Even though this result is supposed

the entirety of a case as opposed to following the transferee judge’s suggestion
that it remand only one claim. See 112 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (J.P.M.L. 2000).
96. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 31.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2012) (“No proceedings for review of any order of
the panel may be permitted except by extraordinary writ pursuant to the
provisions of title 28, section 1651, United States Code.”); In re Wilson, 451
F.3d 161, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We have observed that because of the ‘great
weight’ that the JPML places upon an MDL court’s suggestion of remand, ‘only
those plaintiffs who actually sought suggestion of remand from the [MDL] court
have satisfied the first prong of the mandamus inquiry.’” (quoting Patenaude,
210 F.3d at 142)).
98. Wilson, 451 F.3d at 170; Patenaude, 210 F.3d at 146 (holding that
“because individual settlement negotiations and conferences are ongoing in the
plaintiffs’ individual cases, and because the transferee court is conducting
discovery on overlapping issues that affect many asbestos cases, even if not the
plaintiffs’, coordinated pretrial proceedings have not concluded”).
99. Wilson, 451 F.3d at 170 (3d Cir. 2006). Cf In re Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (“The exercise of that
[remand] discretion generally turns on the question of whether the case will
benefit from further coordinated proceedings as part of the MDL.” (citing In re
Air Crash Disaster, 461 F. Supp. 671, 672–73 (J.P.M.L. 1978))).
100. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26
(1998).
101. Id. at 35.
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to be “impervious to judicial discretion,”102 circuit courts have read
it in conjunction with Rule 16, which allows judges to facilitate
settlement conferences.103 The result endows transferee judges
with near eternal pretrial authority that persists long after joint
discovery and uniform pretrial rulings have ceased.
So, even though Congress saw it fit to give the Panel the power
to remand cases at a party’s behest,104 in practice, the three roads to
remand—at the transferee court’s suggestion, the Panel’s own
initiative, or by motion of any party—have converged to one.
Remand occurs only if the transferee judge suggests it. And
transferee judges prefer to avoid remand and the stigma of
“failure” that accompanies it. Thus, when a transferee judge clings
to cases in hopes of coercing a settlement,105 there is no path
around the bottleneck.106
III. LIBERATING CASES THROUGH REMAND
In theory, the bottleneck should not exist. Even before the
Supreme Court’s admonishment in Lexecon, the Panel recognized
that transferee judges will not “necessarily complete all pretrial
proceedings,” but “will conduct the common pretrial proceedings.”107
Of course, practice has proven otherwise.
Nevertheless, there are some indications that change may be
underway. The chairman of the Panel, Judge John G. Heyburn, has
stated:
102. Id.
103. Patenaude, 210 F.3d at 144–46. Some trial courts have taken a more
limited view. See, e.g., In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic Prods.
Liab. Litig., 276 F.R.D. 336, 339 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (“Matters related to the
administration of individual trials—or matters that relate to only a few cases—
should be decided by the court that will actually conduct the trial. The purpose
of an MDL is to foster efficiency by having a single judge address and decide
issues that will apply to all (or at least a significant number of) the transferred
cases.”).
104. The party requesting remand has the burden of demonstrating that
remand is appropriate. See In re Integrated Res., Inc. Real Estate Ltd. P’ships.
Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y 1994) (citing In re Holiday Magic
Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L. 1977)).
105. See generally In re Activated Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing Mktg. &
Sales Practices Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 (D. Minn. 2012) (“Efforts to
effect a global settlement may provide a sufficient basis for keeping transferred
actions in an MDL court, but in light of the previous failed attempts, settlement
appears unlikely under the circumstances here.” (citation omitted)).
106. In contrast, courts can and have considered remand sua sponte. See, e.g.,
id. at 1201 (ordering remand to transferor courts sua sponte).
107. In re Evergreen Valley Project Litig., 435 F. Supp. 923, 924 (J.P.M.L.
1977) (emphasis added).
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We are well aware that, in certain MDL dockets, the parties
have vigorously disputed whether cases should be remanded
to the transferor courts. We have adopted a more proactive
approach to these concerns. We have emphasized to
transferee judges that, unlike their judicial appointment, an
MDL assignment need not extend for a lifetime. We are
encouraging judges to consider remand where their basic
work is completed.108
Moreover, Judge Eduardo C. Robreno, who presided over the
federal asbestos multidistrict litigation, and Judge Mark Davidson,
who handled all Texas state court asbestos litigation, have
embraced and advocated the fundamental idea of disaggregating
cases.109
To incite these tentative steps toward remand, this Part urges
the Panel and transferee judges to consider two additional
measures. First, the Panel should seriously consider parties’
remand requests even when the transferee judge does not support
them. Second, transferee judges should routinely entertain a
suggestion for remand by a party or initiate them sua sponte as
soon as discovery on common issues concludes and only casespecific issues remain.
The first measure—encouraging the Panel to actively consider
motions to remand from the parties even when they lack the
transferee judge’s blessing—is designed to remedy the bottleneck
that current practice creates. Without rejuvenating this avenue for
recourse, the concern that “the [P]anel has abdicated its proper
role” will persist.110 As long as the Panel continues to “reward”
transferee judges who quickly settle cases with new multidistrict
litigation assignments and quietly bemoan the rest, transferee
judges will prefer to keep assignments as long as it takes to
browbeat the parties into settling. And, while the second measure
is designed to destigmatize remand as a failure, norms do not shift
overnight. Parties need immediate recourse from a system that
flattens review into a single source: the transferee judge.
Congress expressly gave the Panel this reviewing function.
Despite the Panel’s protests to the contrary,111 it need not speculate

108. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 32.
109. Vairo, supra note 20, at 1057–59.
110. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 31.
111. E.g., In re Brand-Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 170 F. Supp.
2d 1350, 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2001) (deferring to the transferee judge as to when to
remand because she has special insight into the question of whether further
coordinated or consolidated proceedings are likely to be useful) (citing In re
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about the transferee judge’s motivations for keeping a case. Parties
will typically first ask the transferee judge to suggest remand. This
gives the judge an opportunity to explain her rationale for refusing
to do so. And the adversarial nature of the process—with most
controlling stakeholders opposing remand—would give the Panel a
complete picture of the litigation’s development. It could thus
police cases where transferee judges exceed multidistrict
litigation’s scope and purpose.
The second measure aims to make remand a standard feature of
multidistrict litigation, at least as soon as common discovery
concludes and the judge has ruled on motions that affect the cases
uniformly. This combats the stigma that a transferee judge has
somehow failed if she suggests that the Panel remand her cases. It
serves as a signpost: the judge has fulfilled her mandate by
ensuring common pretrial issues were handled on a coordinated,
efficient basis, but centralization has now reached the point of
diminishing returns. If the practice becomes routine, it may also
serve to deter attorneys from filing weak claims in hopes of
freeriding on lead lawyers’ efforts, which could result in global
settlements that hew closely to a claim’s true value.
Entertaining a suggestion of remand or proposing it sua sponte
when common discovery ends resonates with transferee judges’
articulated rationales in the few cases they have remanded. For
instance, transferee judges have asked the Panel to send cases back
to their transferor districts when only case-specific discovery and
motions remain,112 after denying class certification,113 when
Holiday Magic Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L.
1977)).
112. In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 145 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that the Panel
may remand “when everything that remains to be done is case-specific”); In re
Activated Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 840
F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 (D. Minn. 2012); In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1407, 2004 WL 2034587, at * 2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 3,
2004) (“[T]he transferee court typically does not rule on cumbersome, casespecific legal issues.” (citing In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d
791 (N.D. Ohio 2004))); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d
1196, 1198 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (“[P]laintiff may renew her request for suggestion
for remand, so long as it is accompanied by the certification that all discovery
she intends to conduct in preparation for trial is complete or that her remaining
discovery is entirely casespecific [sic].”); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1014, 1997 WL 109595, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 1997)
(declining to rule on summary judgment motions because the transferee court
“would be putting itself in the shoes of the transferor courts”).
113. Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 (“Further,
when transferred to this Court by the JPML, each Related Action potentially was
a large class case, impacting dozens (if not hundreds or thousands) of plaintiffs
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transferor courts should consider state-specific class actions,114
when settlement talks fail,115 when a party declines to participate in
a global settlement,116 and when a case is ready for trial.117 As
several transferee judges observed, when courts refuse to remand
cases after common discovery ends, they impede dispositive, casespecific summary judgment motions that require intimate knowledge
of state substantive law—the transferor judge’s specialty.118
So, the second measure has two goals: (1) to pay more than lip
service to the premise that multidistrict litigation is designed to
resolve common issues and then remand cases for trial, and (2)
who had purchased the defendants’ products. But the Court has denied class
certification in each action, leaving nearly all of them as single-plaintiff cases.”).
114. In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74,
77 (D. Me. 2011) (“There are only four remaining cases and in each, the
Plaintiffs reasonably claim that the class certification issues present casespecific questions unique to the state law of their respective jurisdictions.
Furthermore, the transferor courts, each of which is familiar with the state law of
their respective jurisdictions, are in a better position to assess the parties’ state
law arguments and their impact on the class certification issue.”); In re Chrysler
LLC 2.7 Liter V-6 Engine Oil Sludge Prods. Liab. Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1372,
1373 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (“We are presented with five putative statewide class
actions for five different states under each state’s laws. While it is clear that
discovery will overlap, class certification will vary. Therefore, the transferee
judge may find that, eventually, the just and efficient conduct of these actions
would best be served by suggesting to the Panel that the Panel remand these
actions to the transferor courts for class certification considerations.”). But see
Baltimore Cnty. v. AT&T Corp., 735 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1098 (S.D. Ind. 2010)
(“In this multi-district litigation, No. 1313, the court has presided over more
than 40 state-wide class action settlements through final judgments and
administration of the settlements.”).
115. Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (“In addition,
the Court has undertaken several attempts to resolve this MDL in its entirety
through settlement, without success (despite yeoman efforts by the Magistrate
Judge). Efforts to effect a global settlement may provide a sufficient basis for
keeping transferred actions in an MDL court, but in light of the previous failed
attempts, settlement appears unlikely under the circumstances here.” (citation
omitted)).
116. See, e.g., Baltimore Cnty., 735 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (remanding one
remaining case that refused to settle).
117. In re Yamaha Motor Corp. Rhino ATV Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp.
2d 1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (“When any transferred action becomes ready for
trial, the transferee judge may suggest that the Panel remand the action to the
transferor court.”).
118. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1663, 2009 WL
1874085, at *3 (D.N.J. June 30, 2009) (remanding cases after completing
common discovery to allow parties to file dispositive motions); In re Orthopedic
Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1014, 1997 WL 109595, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 7, 1997) (declining to rule on summary judgment motions because the
transferee court “would be putting itself in the shoes of the transferor courts”).
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eliminate remand’s status as a second-best option, when global
settlement talks fail. To be sure, there is nothing inherently wrong
with settlement. But settlements should be the byproduct of
vigorous litigation, not the endgame that they have become for the
controlling stakeholders. When the litigation’s focal point is
settlement, there is a significant danger that settlement furthers
stakeholders’ interests at claimants’ expense and sacrifices the
differences in state substantive laws along the way.
CONCLUSION
If the undercurrents of change are to take hold and make
remand a viable option, the Panel and the transferee judges must be
the ones to embrace and implement that shift. As this Article has
explored, lead plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants gain little to
nothing by having cases remanded to the transferor courts. But
individual plaintiffs and (sometimes) their attorneys can suffer
without remand, as can state substantive laws, procedural justice,
and democratic participation opportunities.
Remand can yield fairer compensation for those with strong
claims by restoring claimants’ option to “see you in court,” and
weeding out the weak cases that threaten to dilute compensation
funds. Moreover, it can help ensure that defendants do not exploit
the regulatory mismatch between a nationwide transferee forum
and the state laws that often govern defendants’ conduct. In cases
founded on state laws, like consumer protection and products
liability, transferee judges should be more willing to remand so
that transferor judges might decide whether defendants’ conduct
can be best addressed—and deterred—through state-specific class
actions or trial. Otherwise, multidistrict litigation will serve chiefly
as settlement’s handmaiden and trial’s death knell.

